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Abstract
This paper describes DSFS, a decentralized security
system for large parallel file system. DSFS stores global
access control lists (ACLs) in a centralized decision-
making server and pushes pre-authorization lists (PALs)
into storage devices. Thus DSFS allows users to flexibly
set any access control policy for the global ACL or
even change the global ACL system without having
to upgrade the security code in their storage devices.
With pre-authorization lists, DSFS enables a network-
attached storage device to immediately authorize I/O,
instead of demanding a client to acquire an authoriza-
tion from a centralized authorization server at a crucial
time. The client needs to acquire only an identity key
from an authentication server to access any devices she
wants. Experimental results show that DSFS achieves
higher performance and scalability than traditional
capability-based security protocols.
1. Introduction
Large-scale and high-performance storage systems
have gained increasing importance in science, engineer-
ing and business applications. High-performance com-
puting (HPC) applications of today and tomorrow, such
as High-Energy Physics, Biosciences, Astrophysics, and
Geophysics call for high-performance data access and
Petabytes to Extabytes of data storage. Large business
services such as Google and Yahoo! may service mil-
lions of users and store tens to hundreds of petabytes of
data, a storage capacity that may soon reach the Exabyte
scale. Securing such large-scale and high-performance
storage systems is an important challenge because of
the highly parallel and dense data accesses from a large
number of users and the massive amounts of personal
and sensitive data stored on them.
Unfortunately, the design concept of existing large-
scale storage systems makes their security solutions
more challenging and urgent. Recent studies [1–6] on
large, high-performance storage systems have enabled
direct interaction between clients and storage devices.
A key concept behind this design is the decoupling
of metadata and data paths. The client’s data is typ-
ically striped across multiple devices to achieve high
parallelism. Before accessing the devices, the clients
acquire the necessary metadata information from a
metadata server (MDS), and then directly interact with
the storage devices. MDS is thus completely bypassed
during the data transfer phase, which improves the
performance and scalability of the system. However,
attaching storage devices to the client-network renders
these devices vulnerable to various network attacks,
such as eavesdropping, masquerading and replaying.
The storage devices must be intelligent to authenticate
users and restrict illegal accesses rather than connected
to and protected by an individual server. However,
separating metadata from data has resulted in the loss
of implicit knowledge of access privileges or authoriza-
tions at the storage devices because the information is
now stored at MDS.
To secure I/O, MDS must communicate autho-
rizations to storage devices. In the existing security
schemes [7–13], a client wishing to access storage
devices must acquire a capability authorizing the I/O
from MDS and then present it to the storage device
with the I/O request. However, when incorporated into
large parallel file systems, these solutions based on
capabilities either degrade performance or strongly de-
pend on the workload and application environment, thus
limiting the scope of these approaches. For example,
a capability-based scheme may issue a capability for
every block or object being accessed, i.e., a capability
authorizes a single block or object I/O [9]. This requires
the generation of tens or even hundreds of millions of
capabilities, which imposes a substantial overhead on
the authorization server and does not scale well in large-
scale storage systems [11]. To reduce the number of
capabilities, coarse-grained access control [10] allows
a capability to authorize I/O to a set of objects, but
constrains the granularity of access control. Maat [11],
a scalable security protocol developed in Ceph [6],
employs an extended capability to authorize I/O for any
number of clients to any number of files, thus signifi-
cantly decreasing the number of capabilities that MDS
and OSD (object-based storage device) need to generate
and verify. However, the strategy in Maat to group
multiple I/O authorizations into extended capabilities
is strongly dependent on the workload and application
environment, thus limiting the scope of this approach.
This paper introduces DSFS, a decentralized security
system for large parallel file system, designed to pro-
vide decentralized access control by pushing access
control decisions into storage devices. Our goal for the
DSFS system is to enable a network-attached storage
device to immediately authorize I/O and benefit from
any high-level access control policies without imposing
any restrictions on data placement and management in
existing parallel file systems.
The salient feature of DSFS lies in the fact that it
stores a global access control list (ACL) in a central-
ized decision-making server, i.e., MDS, and pushes the
server’s access control decisions into storage devices.
The storage devices can thus use the pre-stored deci-
sions, in the form of local pre-authorization list (PAL),
to make authorization decisions. The advantage of doing
this is that (a) DSFS allows users to flexibly set any pol-
icy for the global ACL or even change the global ACL
system but without impacting on the implementation of
local PALs on storage devices, because all the polices or
changes will be pre-interpreted to a simple authorization
list that can be stored as the accessed object’s security
attributes on storage devices. (b) With pre-stored au-
thorization decisions, DSFS enables a network-attached
storage device to immediately authorize I/O, instead of
demanding a client to acquire a capability from MDS
for each object she wants to access. This is a more
scalable solution as the cryptographic cost for MDS
to generate capabilities has been removed from the
critical I/O path. Similarly to the SCARED authenti-
cation approach [12], the client can thus use an identity
key obtained from a centralized authentication server
to access any devices, including MDS, she wishes to
access.
We demonstrate and prove the DSFS concept on an
object-based storage system (OBS) and implement a
DSFS prototype in the HUST OSD project [14] that
complies to the T10 standard [13]. Our implementation
requires minimal changes to the current standard, which
includes only an extended security attribute page and a
collection object required, but enables the standard to
support decentralized access control. We evaluate DSFS
through trace-driven experiments and high-bandwidth
benchmarks and compare it with the T10 OSD-2 se-
curity protocol and the state-of-the-art Maat security
protocol. Experimental results show that DSFS achieves
significantly higher performance and scalability than the
T10 OSD-2 and Maat security protocols. To achieve
the same performance as DSFS does, the latter two
must make the capability cache hit rate approach to
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Figure 1. Parallel file system architecture and secu-
rity flow. Clients request capabilities from MDS and
use them to request I/O from storage devices.
an impractical 100%.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Back-
ground and related work are presented in Section 2.
Section 3 describes the DSFS architecture. Section 4
details the design and implementation of DSFS on an
object-based storage system. Section 5 evaluates the
effectiveness of DSFS through trace-driven experiments
and high-bandwidth benchmarks on the DSFS proto-
type. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Background and Related Work
2.1. Decentralized vs. Centralized Access Con-
trol
Most of parallel file systems [1–6] that have been
developed recently consist of three main components:
clients, a metadata server cluster (MDS), and a cluster
of storage devices, such as network-attached disks or
object-based storage devices (OSD). Decentralized ac-
cess control refers to access controls where ACLs are
stored and users are authenticated and authorized at the
storage devices, as opposed to centralized access control
where ACLs are stored and users are authenticated at
a centralized metadata server, where the users are then
granted capabilities.
The main idea behind the centralized access control
scheme is that maintaining ACLs at a centralized server
makes modification to ACLs easier and reduces the
complexity on storage devices. The storage devices can
thus have an optimized simple security check on the
capability. They can dedicate themselves to busy data
moving and are oblivious to how users are authen-
ticated and ACLs are implemented. Figure 1 shows
the architecture and security flow in most parallel file
systems. Clients request capabilities from the MDS
and use them to request I/O from the storage devices.
The capabilities are cryptographically hardened with
a digital signature or HMAC [15] through the use of
MDS’s public key or the shared keys between MDS and
storage devices respectively. In most cases, capabilities
can be attained at a negligible cryptographic cost at
the same time when the client gets the metadata with
object location information. However, for large files
striped across hundreds or even thousands of devices,
a simple access to a single file would require MDS to
generate hundreds or even thousands of capabilities. In
addition, for security purposes, the capability is usually
specified a valid period as short as possible and the
sharing keys between MDS and storage devices should
be refreshed regularly. Once the capabilities being used
are invalidated because of expiry or revocation, the
client will have to incur an extra round trip to get
new capabilities. Most capability-based schemes use
cache to optimize the system performance. For example,
MDS can cache pre-computed capabilities and clients
can cache unexpired capabilities. But the efficiency
of cached capabilities is strongly dependent on the
workload and application environment.
The main idea behind the decentralized access control
scheme is to remove the authorization process, i.e.,
capability generation and dispatch, from the critical I/O
path through offloading the access privileges to storage
devices. The storage devices can thus directly authen-
ticate and authorize users without needing any capabil-
ities, that is, without needing any capability cache and
the cost of capability generation and verification in the
critical I/O path. As a result, the same number of MDSs
can service more storage devices, implying higher par-
allel performance. However, straightforwardly storing
ACLs along with the accessed objects means that
storage devices must be able to make authorization
decisions according to object’s ACLs and high-level
access control policies, such as ACL inheritance, an
important means to simplify management of ACLs
in large hierarchical systems. It requires the storage
devices to store and know the relationship between
objects in a file system, which implies complex security
implementation and a high cost of security check. This
contradicts the design concept of parallel file systems in
which the storage devices usually do not know how the
object it holds fits into the file system. Therefore, ideal
decentralized security solutions for parallel file systems
should keep the existing system architecture and file
placement and impose a minimal cost of security check
on storage devices. Based on this design principle,
the proposed DSFS in this paper is intended to take
advantage of decentralized access control but without
imposing any restrictions on the performance and file
placement of parallel file systems.
2.2. Related Work
There have been numerous efforts to secure parallel
and distributed storage systems [7–13, 16], most of
which are based on capabilities. A fine-grained ca-
pability [7, 9] may authorize access privileges at the
granularity of a block or object. In a large-scale system,
a hotspot file containing terabytes of data may be
accessed by thousands of clients. The system may stripe
the file across hundreds or even thousands of devices
to achieve data redundancy and highly parallel I/O. A
single access to such a file would need hundreds or
thousands of fine-grained capabilities. Especially, the
I/O pattern in such systems is usually highly parallel
and very bursty [17]; it is impractical to generate and
return tens of thousands of capabilities in a timely
manner. To cut down the number of capabilities in
the system, NASD [9], SnapDragon [7], LWFS [10],
and the T10 OSD security protocol [13] all allow a
capability to grant access to a group of objects . But
coarse-grained capabilities constrain the granularity of
access control. Maat [11] employs extended capabilities
to provide scalable I/O security for lager-scale parallel
file systems. However, an effective grouping strategy
to group multiple I/O authorizations into an extended
capability in Maat implies a relatively large space
and time penalty to store past behaviors and compute
predictions. As a result, Maat’s “authorization grouping
strategy has a dramatic impact on the performance
improvements gained by extended capabilities” [11].
SCARED [12] extends NASD [9] to provide mutual
authentication between clients and devices. It supports
authentication based on capabilities (as in NASD) as
well as identity keys. In the latter case the SCARED
device also stores ACLs along with the object. The
SCARED identity key is usually derived from a shared
secret key between the administrator and the devices.
A client can use an identity key obtained from the
administrator to access the SCARED device that then
authorizes the request according to the local ACLs
stored on it. The goal of the SCARED project was to
develop a distributed serverless file system by enabling
a device to store and manage the storage of file system
data and metadata. This implies that the access control
policy and enforcement of the whole file system must
be built on SCARED devices, though in fact existing
publicly available literatures [12, 18] do not detail how
high-level access control policies are implemented on
the SCARED devices. Similar to SCARED, other tradi-
tional distributed file systems, like AFS [19], SFS [20]
and NFS V4 [21], store and manage the whole or
portion of the file system data and metadata in file
servers. They have different security requirements with
existing parallel file systems.
Kher and Kim [16] use role-based access control
(RBAC) in their system. They store role-based access
control lists with each object on object-based storage
devices. Since changes to role permissions (i.e., to
the role-based access control list) are infrequent as
compared to changes to role memberships, RBAC can
reduce the complexity and cost of security administra-
tion in large parallel file systems. In most of the cases,
a client needs to acquire only an identity key from the
file manager, which can be used by the client to further
derive role keys. The device verifies the identity of the
client by verifying the role key and then authorizes the
request according to the role-based access control list.
Unfortunately, Kher and Kim do not address the design
and implementation issues of role-based access control
lists, a key to developing decentralized access control
in large parallel file systems.
3. DSFS Architecture
For DSFS we aim to be able to have many of the ben-
efits of the decentralized access control without having
any restrictions on data placement and management in
existing parallel file systems. Our goal is to be able
to allow users to set arbitrary access control policies
without having to change the security code in their
storage devices.
To achieve these goals, DSFS stores a global ACL
at MDS, i.e., the centralized decision-making server.
MDS makes access control decisions according to the
global ACL and then pushes them into storage devices.
The access control decisions are stored along with the
accessed objects in the form of local pre-authorization
lists (PALs) at storage devices. Next, the client authenti-
cates herself to the authentication server that then issues
her an identity key. Since the identity key is derived
from the shared key between the authentication server
and storage devices, the storage devices can verify the
client’s identity by verifying the identity key. With the
client’s identity and local PALs, the storage devices can
determine whether to authorize the request. Figure 2
shows the DSFS’s architecture and security flow. Since
all access control decisions are made at MDS and the
storage devices store only the final decisions, users
can set arbitrary policies for the global ACL or even
change the global ACL system without impacting on
the implementation of local PALs. And because the
final pre-authorization lists can be directly associated
with the accessed objects as security attributes, there
is no change to the data layout in the storage devices.
Security check is also simple, that is, only a matching
in PAL is required at the storage devices.
3.1. Authentication
DSFS’ goal for authentication in parallel file systems
is to make authentication fit into existing security in-
frastructure while keep the authentication process as
simple as possible to ensure a high-performance I/O.
To achieve this goal, DSFS separates authentication
services from the file system. Like the SCARED au-
thentication approach [12], the client is authenticated
at a dedicated authentication server that then issues
her an identity key for the subsequent access to the
file system. The authentication server can authenticate
clients independently or in collaboration with existing
Storage 
Devices
Clients
Authentication 
Server
Metadata 
Server
Identity key
 I/O, identity key
Local 
PAL
Pre-authorization 
list
metadata, 
identity key
Shared 
Secret keys
Global 
ACL
Local 
PAL
Local 
PAL
Identity
Figure 2. DSFS architecture and security flow.
MDS stores a global ACL and pushes PALs into
storage devices.
security infrastructure. In the former case, the server it-
self must store and maintain users’ identity information,
such as user identifiers and the user-to-role associations.
In the latter case, for example, a server in collaboration
with an X.509 certificate authority simply validates the
client’s certificate and then encodes the identities from
the certificate into the identity key.
Access to a storage device is controlled using a single
secret K, which is shared by the storage device and
authentication server. An identity key can be generate as
idkey =MACK(Kdata), where MAC is a secure mes-
sage authentication code such as HMAC [15]. Kdata
will be encoded as a concatenation of three values:
Kdata = {Kid, identity, expiration}. Kid is a unique
identifier indicating the K used to generate the idkey.
Multiple keys can be shared at the same time, thus
refreshing a shared key would not impact the unexpired
identity keys generated by other shared keys. identity
indicating the user’s identity is a concatenation of two
values: identity = {Uid, Rid}, where Uid is the user
identifier and Rid is the identifier of the role assumed
by the user. Though a user can assume multiple roles
in a practical application, we only encode one role
into the identity key to reduce the cost of PAL check.
expiration is the time limit of the validity of the idkey.
The generated idkey and Kdata are sent to the user.
Note that idkey must be kept secret, but Kdata is not
considered secret. Once the user has idkey and Kdata,
she sends Kdata to the storage device. With the shared
secret K and Kdata, the device can calculate idkey,
which is then used as a shared secret between the user
and device. Besides establishing a shared secret, the
derivation using Kdata binds the information encoded
in Kdata to idkey. Thus the storage device can make
access control decision based on the identities encoded
in Kdata and local PALs stored on it.
Authentication to MDS is almost the same as authen-
tication to the storage device. The only difference is that
PAL Header:
       PAL Flag: ACCESS_PAL
      PAL Size: 70 bytes
      PAE Count: 2
PAE 1:
      Role ID: budget manager
     Access Rights: read, write, delete
PAE 2:
      Role ID: business  manager
     Access Rights: read, write      
Figure 3. A sample PAL on an object with two
entries (PAEs).
idkey is derived from the shared key between the MDS
and authentication server.
3.2. Authorization
DSFS stores pre-authorization lists along with each
object to enable the storage device to immediately
authorize I/O. A pre-authorization list is similar in form
to the ACL in common use. A sample PAL with two
pre-authorization entries (PAEs) is shown in Figure 3.
A PAL is made up of a header and an arbitrary number
of PAEs. A PAE defines access privileges of a user
or a role. The former grants only one user access to
the object with which the pre-authorization entry is
associated, while the latter authorizes a group of users
belonging to the role. Though user PAEs are supported,
we prefer to use role PAEs for the whole authorization
framework since the number of roles is usually less than
the number of users and a change to the role’s privileges
is infrequent relative to a change to a user’s privileges.
The PAL flag specifies the type of this PAL. Two
types of PALs, namely, access PAL and super PAL,
are proposed for two different purposes. The access
PAL defines the usual access permissions of protected
objects. The super PAL defines the permissions capable
of being shared by a group of objects since in practice
there will not likely be many different PALs when
compared to the number of objects.
Figure 4 illustrates the pre-authorization model in a
DSFS system. A pre-authorization is triggered when an
object is created, or the permission is modified, or a
PAL inconsistency occurs. In the case of object creation,
the new object will be assigned a default permission,
such as the object owner’s permission, or automatically
share a super PAL. In the cases of permission modifi-
cation and PAL inconsistency, MDS makes new access
control decisions and writes the latest pre-authorization
list into the storage device. For example, assuming that
the ACL for the file “/jim/foo” is C. The inherited ACL
of her parent directory “/jim” is I . Then the object
containing the data of “/jim/foo” will have the pre-
authorization list C|I . To reduce the number of the
occurrences of PAL inconsistency, MDS should ensure
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Figure 4. Pre-authorization model in a DSFS sys-
tem
that the pre-authorization list is successfully written into
the storage device. As the figure shows, a multiple-
level inheritance model at MDS will be interpreted to
a single-level sharing model on the storage devices.
3.3. Revocation
In addition to traditional revocation mechanisms built
on certificates and ACLs, DSFS enables immediate
revocation via invalidating an identity key. Revoking
an identity key is possible in two ways. One method
is key expiration. When giving an identity key to a
client, the authentication server includes an expiration
time in the key data. When the identity key held by
a user expires, the user has to acquire a new key to
declare its own identity. This approach works well when
identities are used in a transient manner. For example,
in order to authorize a temporary access to the system,
the authentication server can define a short lifetime for
the user’s identity key. Another method is key exchange.
By changing the shared key, all previous identity keys
the authentication server had generated for a particular
storage device are now invalid.
4. DSFS Design on OBS
As one of the most promising technological solutions
to next-generation storage systems, object storage has
received increasing attention in the past few years. This
section details the design of DSFS on an object-based
storage system, which is compliant with the current T10
OSD standard [13].
4.1. PAL Storage
DSFS stores global ACLs along with the metadata
of file and directory in the form of database records at
MDS. All changes to the global ACLs will be mapped
to the database records. The existing policies applied
to metadata can also be applied to the global ACLs.
The local pre-authorization lists are stored as object
Table 1. The extended PAL attribute page
Attribute
Number
Length
(bytes) Attribute
Client
Settable
OSD
Logical Unit
Provided
0h 40 Pageidentification No Yes
1h 1 List flag Yes No
2h to FFh Reserved No
0100h to
BFFF FFFFh 13 User PAE Yes No
C000 0000h to
FFFF FF00h 13 Role PAE Yes No
FFFF FF01h to
FFFF FFFEh Reserved No
Table 2. Collection type codes
Code Name Description
00h LINKED T10 specific
01h TRACKING T10 specific
02h PAL User objects may be added
to or removed from the col-
lection using the Collections
attributes page.
03h to EEh Reserved
EFh SPONTANEOUS T10 specific
F0h to FFh Reserved
attributes along with each object at the storage device.
Since many studies have addressed the storage and
maintenance issues of metadata and for the sake of
space constraint, this paper mainly describes the design
and implementation of local PALs for object-based file
systems (OBFS) at OSDs.
The T10 OSD standard stores and maintains object
attributes in the form of attribute page. We propose
an extended PAL attribute page that defines the fun-
damental PAL attributes and values shown in Table 1.
An extended PAL attribute page includes a list of PAE
attributes, including user PAE attribute (0100h to BFFF
FFFFh) and role PAE attribute (C000 0000h to FFFF
FF00h). The list flag attribute specifies the type of this
PAL, access PAL or super PAL. An advantage of storing
PALs in the form of attribute page is that the existing
commands of setting attributes defined in the standard
can be applied to PALs.
According to the T10 OSD standard, an OSD storage
device contains one or more OSD logical units, each
with four types of stored data objects: root object,
partition, collection and user object. Each OSD logical
unit has exactly one root object, as well as a variety of
partitions. Each partition contains a set of collections
and user objects. The user object contains end-user data
(e.g., file or database data), while the collection is used
for fast indexing of user objects. The standard requires
each attribute page stored at OSD to be associated
with an object. Access PAL page can be associated
with user objects and provides access control to the
latter. We propose an extended PAL collection shown
in Table 2. Thus super PAL page can be associated with
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PAL collections. The user objects referenced by a PAL
collection can share the super PAL associated with that
PAL collection. To avoid confusion, a user object can
be a member of one and only one PAL collection.
4.2. PAL Layout in OBFS
Since attributes in an OSD are organized in pages,
and the same number and kind of pages are usually
associated with the same kind of objects, we store
these relatively fixed attribute pages in the forepart of
objects to achieve fast accesses to attributes. To meet the
requirement of storing a variable-length attribute page,
such as the PAL attribute page, we use an extended
attribute region to store an overrunning attribute.
As shown in Figure 5, the OBFS implementation
divides an OSD logical unit into different regions for
different functions. The super block records the charac-
teristics of OBFS, including its size, the data block size,
the empty and the filled data blocks and their respective
counts, the size and location of the different regions,
etc. The B+ tree region stores all B+ trees in OBFS.
OBFS uses B+ trees to retrieve three types of data:
1) objects’ onodes in data regions, 2) data blocks of
large objects, and 3) free blocks in data regions. The
extended attribute region stores the overrunning part of
a variable-length attribute that fails to completely fit
in a fixed-length attribute page. The data region stores
objects’ onodes and data. All of the blocks in a region
have the same size, but the block sizes in different
regions may be different. Regions are initialized when
there are insufficient free blocks in any initialized region
to satisfy a write request. In this case, OBFS allocates a
free region and initializes all of its blocks to the desired
block size. In the current OBFS implementation, the
block size in the B+ tree and data regions is set to
4KB, but the block size in the extended attribute region
is set to 512bytes. Thus a block in the extended attribute
region can hold about 512/13 = 39 PAEs.
OBFS stores a PAL attribute page in an object’
onode, which occupies a block in data regions. An
onode, i.e., object metadata, is used to track the status
of an object, similar to an inodes in a Linux file
system, such as ext2 and ext3 file systems. Figure 6
shows an object structure and PAL layout. The data
and attributes of a small object are directly stored in its
onode, where the PAL attribute comes after the onode
header. The data and attributes (except PALs) of a large
object are stored in data blocks, which are referenced
by the extended pointers in the object’s onode. Each
extended pointer is a two-tuple (address, length), which
can specify any number of sequential blocks. The
PAL in an onode is limited to 32 PAEs. Thus a PAL
including the PAL header and extended pointer occupies
9 + 32 × 13 + 8 = 433 bytes in an onode, where the
PAL header consists of the page number, the list flag
and the number of PAEs in the PAL. The overrunning
PAEs will be stored in the extended attribute region. A
rational limit, such as 32 PAEs, enables an onode to
hold all PAEs in most PALs, each of which can thus be
read into memory with the onode in a lump.
5. Performance Evaluation
We ran extensive experiments to evaluate DSFS in
three aspects: 1) DSFS’s performance under trace-
driven benchmarks and benefits relative to the T10
OSD-2 security protocol and the state-of-the-art Maat
security protocol; 2) the overhead of security adminis-
tration in DSFS and capability-based security storage
systems; and 3) system throughput and scalability of
different security setups under a high-bandwidth work-
load.
5.1. Prototype Implementation
We prototyped DSFS in the HUST OSD project [14].
The prototype stores global ACLs along with other
metadata in a Berkeley database. The SET AT-
TRIBUTES command defined in the T10 standard can
be used to set the pre-authorization lists. Apart from
proving the identity of a client, the identity key can
also be used to protect the OSD command from various
network attacks, similar to the use of the capability key
for securing an OSD command with the CMDRSP secu-
rity method, one of the three security methods defined
in the T10 OSD standard. We also implemented the
Maat security protocol in our prototype system. With
the initial OSD-2 security protocol implementation,
our new OSD implementation supports three security
schemes: DSFS, OSD-2 and Maat.
5.2. Experimental Setup
The experiments were conducted on 3 to 17 Linux
hosts, each with one Intel Xeon 3.0 GHz processor
and a total of 512MB physical memory (except MDS
with 4GB physical memory). Each node was connected
to a Highpoint Rocket 2240 Raid controller attached
to 7 SATA disks (7200RPM, 300GB each). We used
a separate SATA disk to house the operating system
(Fedora Core 4, kernel version 2.6.12) and configured
the other 6 disks into a RAID0 array to store data. All
machines were connected by 1-Gbits Ethernet. In each
experiment, one machine acted as MDS, while others
acted as OSDs or clients.
In our experiments, we assumed for DSFS that the
client had authenticated herself to the authentication
server and gotten an identity key. For the Maat security
protocol, we assumed that there has been a shared key
between the client and OSD, which is used to protect the
OSD command and fulfill the Maat security protocol.
For the OSD-2 security protocol, the CMDRSP security
method was used because this method provides the
same security as DSFS does. In addition, we pre-stored
1 million records of metadata in the Berkeley DB for
all experiments. We also assumed that the number of
PAEs in a PAL is not more than 32, that is, the PAL
can be stored into the object’s onode. We identify the
evaluation of overrun PALs as our future work.
5.3. Operation Latency
To determine the performance impact of the DSFS,
Maat and OSD-2 security schemes, we timed open() op-
erations at the MDS, and write() and read() operations
at the client under several scenarios and compared these
times to the times required in a non-secure system. The
experiment was run on a collection of 512 files, each
of size 4KB. Two kinds of system configurations are
evaluated for the OSD-2 security protocol. One stored
a file in a single OSD and another striped a file across
10 OSDs to achieve high parallel performance. We
limited an I/O to be striped up to 10 OSDs, that is,
MDS generates at most 10 fine-grained capabilities for
an I/O request, since the experimental results on the
Panasas file system [4] have discovered that striping a
single I/O across more OSDs can cause the potential
incast behavior on the network that results in aggre-
gate bandwidth actually decreasing when increasing
the number of OSDs past 14 in a single I/O. But it
should be noted that limiting an I/O up to 10 OSDs
does not mean a file can be striped across only 10
OSDs. In fact, the Panasas file system uses a two level
Table 3. MDS latencies of open() operations in microseconds (µs).
OSD-2(1) OSD-2(10) MaatLatency (µs) NonSecure DSFS cache miss cache hit cache miss cache hit cache miss cache hit renewal
open() 91 128 173 134 578 136 7369 132 50
Table 4. Latencies of write() and read() operations in microseconds (µs).
client write() read()system metadata capability MetadataGet DataWrite Total MetadataGet DataRead Total
NonSecure known none 0 721 721 0 807 807
DSFS known none 0 942 942 0 1028 1028
OSD-2(1) known cache hit 0 940 940 0 1025 1025
OSD-2(10) known cache hit 0 940 940 0 1025 1025
Maat known valid hit 0 1016 1016 0 1102 1102
Maat known false hit 355 1022 1377 355 1107 1462
NonSecure unknown none 359 721 1080 359 807 1166
DSFS unknown none 433 942 1375 433 1028 1461
OSD-2(1) unknown cache miss 478 984 1462 478 1070 1548
OSD-2(10) unknown cache miss 886 984 1870 886 1070 1956
Maat unknown cache miss 7678 8222 15900 7678 8308 15986
striping pattern to stripe a file across all available OSDs
but avoids massive retransmissions caused by an incast
traffic pattern. This implies that the client in the Panasas
file system has to acquire enough capabilities as the
number of OSDs housing the data of the file when the
file is opened, or cost an extra round trip to acquire
another 10 capabilities from MDS when a parallel I/O
is finished.
Table 3 lists the MDS latencies of open() opera-
tions in microseconds (µs). There are two cases, i.e.,
cache hit and miss, for the OSD-2 and Maat security
protocols, since MDS can pre-computed a capability
for the coming I/O request by predicting future file
accesses. However, DSFS does not experience cache hit
or miss because there is no any capability required in a
DSFS system. When an open() request hits the cache at
MDS, both OSD-2 and Maat result in costs comparable
to DSFS. However, once a request misses the cache,
the OSD-2 security protocol incurs an additional cost
of 45µs for a 1-OSD system and 450µs for a 10-
OSD system that respectively generate one and ten fine-
grained capabilities. Requesting an extended capability
in Maat is extremely slow, roughly 81 times slower than
the non-secure system, 90% of which can be attributed
to the capability generation and 9% to the database
access for multiple metadata records. In this experiment,
an extended capability grouped 8 clients and 8 files,
thus needing 646µs to read 8 records of authorization
information from the Berkeley DB. Maat uses a renewal
protocol to extend the lifetime of expired capabilities,
which incurs an additional penalty of 50µs at MDS.
Table 4 shows the latencies of write() and read() op-
erations in microseconds (µs). For the Maat evaluation,
we define a capability hit during its lifetime as a valid
hit but a hit upon an expired capability as a false hit.
Similar results to the open() operations of Table 3 can
be observed in this table, that is, with a hit in OSD-2
and a valid hit in Maat, the latencies of OSD-2 and Maat
are comparable to DSFS. When a false hit occurs, read
and write operations in Maat run 1.91 and 1.81 times
slower than the non-secure system. This is because the
client usually has stored the location information of the
file but must request a renewal token for the expired
capability, which requires an additional round trip from
the client to MDS. Whenever a cache miss occurs in
a 1-OSD system, the OSD-2 security protocol is 1.35
and 1.33 times slower than the non-secure system for
the write() and read() operations respectively, because
of an additional cost associated with generating and
verifying the fine-grained capability. In a 10-OSD sys-
tem, the OSD-2 security protocol is 1.73 and 1.68 times
slower because the client must request 10 fine-grained
capabilities to open a file. With a cache miss in Maat,
these two types of operations run respectively 15 and
14 times slower than the non-secure system, because
the client must request a new extended capability from
MDS, implying a high cost to generate and verify the
extended capability on MDS and OSD respectively.
These numbers demonstrate that DSFS achieves
lower operation latencies than the T10 OSD-2 and
Maat security protocols. Both OSD-2 and Maat need
to maximize capability cache hits to achieve the same
performance.
5.4. Trace-based Evaluation
In this section, we further examine the performance
and scalability of DSFS against the OSD-2 and Maat se-
curity protocols by using two publicly available traces:
YouTube [22] and CAMPUS [23]. The YouTube trace
is collected by monitoring YouTube traffic in a large
university campus network. The CAMPUS trace is
gathered from Harvard’s main campus server and is
dominated by email traffic. Though these traces are
not special to security design, by analyzing the client’s
behaviors we can evaluate the performance of current
security protocols in terms of hit rates, request delays,
Table 5. A summary statistics for a 24-hour trace.
Request Statistics Req. Files Per ClientTrace Client(IP) file requests max min avg
YouTube 18936 52695 81278 1176 1 4
CAMPUS 13 15541 873345 8418 2 2216
Table 6. The capability hit rate as a function of
lifetime in the T10 OSD-2 security protocol.
YouTube CAMPUSLifetime hit miss hit rate hit miss hit rate
0.5h 3062 78216 3.77% 799998 73347 91.6%
1h 3211 78067 3.95% 809092 64253 92.6%
2h 3339 77939 4.11% 818070 55275 93.7%
6h 3479 77799 4.28% 831320 42025 95.2%
12h 3600 77678 4.43% 837684 35661 95.9%
etc.
Table 5 shows the summary statistics for the traces
over a 24-hour period. For the YouTube trace, we
selected all trace records that contain client requests
to the YuTube server (anonymized IP: 63.22.65.73)
from Wednesday March 12 04:00AM through Thursday
March 13 04:00AM 2008. The CAMPUS trace is taken
from the home02 server at Harvard from Thursday
September 13 04:00AM through Thursday September
13 04:00AM 2001. Since the current OSD-2 and Maat
security protocols authorize clients at the granularity
of a single object and file, we pick out data-related
operations, such as create, read and write, from the
CAMPUS trace and group a series of read or write
requests having sequential addresses from the same
client to the same file into a big file read or write.
The metadata operations, such as lookup and getattr,
are filtered out, since they do not require a capability.
As the table shows, the 24-hour CAMPUS trace has
only 13 clients, with each requesting 2216 files, because
this trace captures only the traffic between the email
and general login servers and the disk arrays. Thus the
CAMPUS trace represents traditional direct-attached
storage environments, where the storage system is di-
rectly attached to the server or workstation. In contrast,
the video server in the YouTube environment directly
provides services to the client that must first acquire the
necessary video information from the YouTube server.
Such a system architecture is also used in most of
current large-scale parallel file systems. Our statistics
show that the YouTube system services a large number
of clients, up to 18936 clients in the 24-hour trace on
a YouTube server.
Since the lifetime of capabilities has a direct impact
on the capability hit rate, before selecting an appropri-
ate lifetime to evaluate the performance of the OSD-
2 and Maat security protocols we first examine the
capability hit rate using different capability lifetimes
and in different trace environments. The results are
shown in Tables 6 and 7. Since there is no privilege
information recorded in these two traces, we assumed
Table 7. The capability hit rate as a function of
lifetime in the Maat security protocol.
YouTubeLifetime valid hit miss false hit valid hit rate
3minute 15126 23318 42834 18.6%
5minute 18651 23318 39309 22.9%
10minute 23831 23318 34129 29.3%
20minute 29811 23318 28149 36.7%
30minute 33415 23318 24545 41.1%
CAMPUSLifetime valid hit miss false hit valid hit rate
3minute 868748 2889 1708 99.5%
5minute 869398 2889 1058 99.5%
10minute 869918 2889 538 99.6%
20minute 870185 2889 271 99.6%
30minute 870276 2889 180 99.6%
that all clients have the same permissions to all files.
For OSD-2, we define a capability hit as a repeated
access from the same client to the same file in a given
period, i.e., the lifetime of capability, and a capability
miss as a first-time access from a client to a file. For
Maat, we assume that the system can accurately predict
a client’s future accesses. We can thus group the client
and ten files that the client will access into an extended
capability, that is, once the client requests a file she
will get an extended capability for her to access ten
different files in the future. We define the request by
which the client gets the extended capability initially
as a capability miss, and valid hit and false hit conform
to the forgoing definitions. Every time a false hit occurs,
the client renewals all extended capabilities that she
holds. We also assume that the cache in the client and
server is large enough to cache all capabilities generated
in 24 hours. For example, a 2GB memory buffer can
cache roughly 20 million fine-grained capabilities or 0.5
million extended capabilities, whereas according to our
statistics there are 78216 OSD-2 capabilities and 23318
Maat capabilities at most in the 24-hour traces. In fact,
these assumptions potentially increase the capability hit
rate. As the tables show that prolonging the lifetime of
fine-grained capabilities do not significantly increase the
capability hit rate, because the relatively long lifetime
allows the client to finish most of her operations be-
fore the capability expires. In contrast, a long lifetime
of extended capabilities can significantly increase the
capability hit rate under the YouTube environment. But
prolonging the lifetime of extended capabilities has no
remarkable impact on the capability hit rate under the
CAMPUS environment, because the CAMPUS client
may hold a large number of extended capabilities, a
renewal can extend all capabilities that she caches.
Although longer lifetime means higher hit rate for
extended capabilities, the automatic revocation mech-
anism used by Maat requires each extended capability
to have a short lifetime. In a large-scale storage system
with a large number of clients, short-lived capabilities
force clients to frequently contact MDS to extend the
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lifetimes of capabilities thus compromising the per-
formance benefit achieved by extended capabilities, as
evidenced by the numbers of the YouTube trace in
Table 7, where the number of false hits is 2.1 times
bigger than that of valid hits.
We replay an hour-long trace from 19:00PM through
20:00PM on our prototype system and measure average
request latency. We use a 1-hour lifetime for fine-
grained capabilities and a 5-minute lifetime, the default
value in the Maat literature, for extended capabilities.
To give prominence to security overhead, for each data
operation we read and write only 4KB data, roughly the
size of an object node, from/to each storage device. As
a common means to improve performance, our current
prototype caches the file-system metadata at clients.
When a request hits the metadata cache, the client need
not acquire metadata from MDS for this request. In this
1-hour experiment the metadata cache has the same hit
rate as the capability cache for fine-grained capabilities.
Figure 7 shows the average open() latency measured
at MDS and Figure 8 shows the average read() latency
measured at clients. (The write() latency results are
similar and thus omitted.) With a high capability hit
rate of up to 94% for OSD-2 and valid hit rate of
up to 99.69% for Maat (shown in Figure 9) under the
CAMPUS workload, the OSD-2 and Maat security pro-
tocols achieve latencies comparable to DSFS. However,
under the YouTube workload OSD-2 is 4.5 times slower
than DSFS in opening a file in a 10-OSD system while
Maat is 16 times slower than DSFS. With the write()
operations these slowdowns are 1.3 and 3.6 times for
OSD-2 and Maat respectively. Even storing a file to a
single OSD, OSD-2 is still slower than DSFS. This is
because with a large number of clients in the YouTube
system, the capability hit rate and valid hit rate is only
3% for OSD-2 and 23% for Maat respectively, as well
as a false hit rate of 51% for Maat.
5.5. Security Administration Overhead
We measured the latency of the chmod operation
to evaluate the overhead of security administration in
DSFS and capability-based security systems (including
OSD-2 and Maat), respectively. For the chmod oper-
ation, DSFS requires two round trips from clients to
MDS and then from the MDS to OSD respectively,
while capability-based security systems require only
one round trip from clients to MDS, because in the
capability-based systems the chmod operation only
needs to modify the privilege information in MDS, but
in the DSFS security system, in addition to modifying
the global ACL, the chmod operation also needs to store
pre-authorization lists to OSD.
Table 8 shows the overhead for the chmod opera-
tion. The system drivers were instrumented to report
the time spent in fine-grained sub-operations. The la-
tency is divided into the following categories: com-
mand encapsulation (CmdEncap), communication to
MDS (CommToMds), communication to OSD (Comm-
ToOsd), database access, disk access, and security (in-
cluding command en/decryption and privilege verifi-
cation for the MDS command; or MAC computation
and privilege verification for the OSD command). As
shown in Table 8, a chmod operation costs a total
of 433µs and 1144µs for capability-based and DSFS
security systems respectively. The latter is 2.6 times
slower than the former. But it should be noted that
permission operations is much less frequent than the
demanding I/O operation, such as read and write.
5.6. Throughput and Scalability
In this subsection, we evaluate under a high-
bandwidth workload how much performance degrada-
tion is incurred when DSFS is added to an unsecured
object-based storage system and compare it with the
OSD-2 setup. The Maat setup is not evaluated in this
experiment because its grouping strategy and benefits
strongly depend on the workload and application envi-
ronment.
We ran a benchmark to measure the raw read, write
performance with multiple transfer sizes (the transferred
bytes per OSD command). A 512MB file is sequentially
read and written from/to a 1-client and 1-OSD system.
Figure 10 shows the bandwidth as a function of transfer
size for the write and read benchmarks. For both non-
secure and secure setups, the throughput increases with
the transfer size. This is because the overall overhead of
OSD command building and validation is less for higher
transfer sizes when compared to lower transfer sizes.
Table 8. Overhead of chmod operations.
MDS Command OSD CommandLatency (µs) CmdEncap CommToMds Security Database CmdEncap CommToOsd Security Disk TotalCost
Capability 38 227 86 82 - - - - 433
DSFS 38 227 86 82 42 258 231 180 1144
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Figure 10. Read/write bandwidth with 1 OSD for the non-secure,
OSD-2 and DSFS setups.
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Figure 11. Aggregate read band-
width with multiple clients/OSDs.
Another important observation from the figure is that
both OSD-2 and DSFS setups have comparable band-
width with the non-secure setup because the benchmark
hardly yields overhead on MDS in a single-client to
single-OSD system. Compared to the non-secure setup,
the read and write performances with both the OSD-2
and DSFS setups decrease by less than 5%.
We ran another benchmark to measure the aggregate
throughput and MDS’s idle CPU time of the non-secure,
OSD-2 and DSFS implementations with 1 through 8
OSDs and clients. Each client read and wrote files on
an OSD and each OSD was accessed by exactly 1 client.
In each run, each client created 512 files, each of size
256KB, on an OSD and sequentially read and wrote
these files in 64KB chunks.
Figure 11 shows the aggregate throughput as a
function of the number of OSDs/Clients for the read
benchmarks. (The write benchmark results have similar
trends and are not shown.) The results show that the
aggregate read throughput of all clients for the non-
secure and DSFS setups scales linearly with the number
of clients/OSDs, which indicates that the MDS imposes
very low overhead on a high-bandwidth workload and
has not become a bottleneck in the non-secure and
DSFS systems with up to 8 clients/OSDs. However,
at the number of 6 clients/OSDs, there is an inflexion
in the curve for the OSD-2 setup. As the number of
clients/OSDs scales up above 6, the aggregate read
throughput in the OSD-2 system starts to flatten out.
This is because substantive capability requests in the
OSD-2 system start to overwhelm the MDS that then
restrains the whole system performance. The average
percentage of idle CPU time, shown in Figure 12, also
clearly illustrates the MDS’s load with different security
setups.
As the figure shows, the MDS’s idle CPU time
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Figure 12. Average percentage of idle CPU time on
the metadata server.
declines as the number of clients/OSDs increases. How-
ever, relative to the non-secure system, DSFS does not
impose any additional overhead on the MDS because
no capabilities are required for the read and write
operations in the DSFS system. Thus the MDS’s idle
CPU time of the DSFS system is comparable to that
of the non-secure system. On the contrary, the MDS’s
idle CPU time with the OSD-2 system declines faster
than that of the non-secure and DSFS systems because
the MDS must prepare a capability for each read or
write request with OSD-2. Note also that the MDS’s
idle CPU time for the write operation is lower than that
for the read operation, because in our current system
implementations the MDS must synchronously update
the file length for each successful write command,
which not only increases the latency of a single write
operation but also overloads the MDS when a larger
number of write operations arise.
6. Conclusions
This paper described DSFS, a decentralized secu-
rity system for large parallel file system, designed
to provide decentralized access control by introducing
pre-authorization lists (PALs) to storage devices. With
PALs, DSFS enables a network-attached storage device
to directly authorize I/O rather than demanding a client
to acquire an authorization from a centralized autho-
rization server. As long as the client authenticates to a
single authentication server and acquires an identity key,
she can access any devices she wants. By maintaining
a global ACL at a centralized making server, DSFS
allows users to set any access control policy for the
global ACL or even change the global ACL system but
without impacting on the file placement in parallel file
systems, without needing to update the security code in
their storage devices.
We prototyped DSFS in the HUST OSD project.
Our implementation requires minimal changes to the
current T10 OSD standard but enables the standard to
support decentralized access control. Experimental Re-
sults from trace-driven experiments and high-bandwidth
workloads show that DSFS achieves lower operation
latencies than the OSD-2 and Maat security protocols.
Both OSD-2 and Maat need to maximize capability
cache hits to achieve the same performance. The cost
of security checks at storage devices for DSFS (up to
32 PAEs in a PAL in our experiments) is comparable
to the overhead of verifying a fine-grained capability.
However, DSFS completely removes the performance
bottleneck on MDS caused by security overhead by
avoiding capabilities for the demanding I/O operations.
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